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Some blockchain programs (smart contracts) have included serious security vulnerabilities. Obsidian is a new typestate-oriented
programming language that uses a strong type system to rule out some of these vulnerabilities. Although Obsidian was designed to
promote usability to make it as easy as possible to write programs, strong type systems can cause a language to be difficult to use. In
particular, ownership, typestate, and assets, which Obsidian uses to provide safety guarantees, have not seen broad adoption in popular
languages and result in significant usability challenges. We performed an empirical study with 20 participants comparing Obsidian
to Solidity, which is the language most commonly used for writing smart contracts today. We observed that most of the Obsidian
participants were able to successfully complete most of the programming tasks we gave them. We also found that asset-related bugs,
which Obsidian detects at compile time, were commonly accidentally inserted by the Solidity participants. We identified potential
opportunities to improve the usability of typestate as well as to apply the usability benefits of Obsidian’s ownership system to other
languages.
CCS Concepts: • Software and its engineering→ Language features; Domain specific languages; • Security and privacy→
Software and application security; • Human-centered computing→ Empirical studies in HCI .
Additional Key Words and Phrases: typestate, linear types, ownership, assets, permissions, blockchain, smart contracts, empirical
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1 INTRODUCTION
Obsidian [9] is a new programming language for writing smart contracts [39], which are programs for blockchain
platforms. Blockchains aim to provide a trusted computing medium among users who have not necessarily established
trust. By decentralizing computation, users can establish strong security properties. Unfortunately, these properties can
only be obtained when the smart contracts themselves implement the intended behavior. Through bugs and security
vulnerabilities in blockchains, attackers have stolen millions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrencies [21, 34]. Most public
smart contracts have been written in Solidity [16], a domain-specific language.
To improve security, researchers have developed new languages with stronger security properties. In this work,
we focus on Obsidian, which was designed to provide safety properties that would be relevant to many blockchain
applications [10]. In addition, Obsidian was designed to be usable though iterative user testing with 44 participants [7]
so that programmers would be able to use it effectively. In prior work, Coblenz et al. showed that most of the participants
in a six-participant qualitative study were able to complete relevant programming tasks [7]. However, that small study
did not compare Obsidian to any other languages, so we wanted to assess whether Obsidian is an improvement over
Solidity. We are only aware of two other languages (HANDS and Quorum) that have been evaluated empirically in a
summative evaluation, and those had relatively conventional type systems. A key contribution of this work, then, is
showing how to conduct a quantitative user evaluation of a programming language with a type system that is unfamiliar
to most available participants.
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asset contract Medicine {}
asset contract Pharmacy
{
Medicine@Owned med;
transaction getNewMedicine(Medicine@Owned >> Unowned m)
{
med = m;
}
}
Refer to the following code for the next two questions.
asset contract Medicine {
}
asset contract Pharmacy {
    Medicine@Owned med;
    transaction getNewMedicine(Medicine@Owned >> Unowned m) {
        med = m;
    }
    transaction throwAwayMedicine() {
        disown med;
    }
}
What is the error (if one exists) with the getNewMedicine transaction?
What is the error (if one exists) with the throwAwayMedicine transaction?
Click Count: 0 clicks
med becomes Unowned, although it should be Owned at the end of the transaction
m is stated as becoming an Unowned reference, but actually stays Owned
The owning reference to m is lost
The owning reference to the original Medicine object (med) is lost
There is no error
An Owned reference cannot be disowned
med is Unowned in the transaction, so it cannot be disowned
Fig. 1. An example practice question on assets from the Obsidian tutorial, showing the correct answer.
Obsidian uses ownership types [5] to express in the type system that each asset (an object that has value and therefore
should not be lost) has exactly one owning reference. Ownership may be transferred between references, but if the
owning reference goes out of scope, then the compiler reports a error. This ensures that owning references to assets
cannot be lost unless they are explicitly disowned by the programmer.
Obsidian extends ownership types with typestate [1] because blockchain programs are typically stateful with objects
supporting different operations depending on their state [17]. Thus, owning references can also specify what state the
referenced object is in. For example, Auction@Open is the type of a reference to an Auction object that is in state Open.
Because only owning references can specify typestate, ownership is implied by the presence of a typestate specification.
Alternatively, Auction@Owned is the type of an owned reference to an Auction object, which may be in any state.
Ownership types are one example of linear types [43]: types that are consumed when used rather than being duplicated,
and which must be consumed rather than merely dropped.
To improve flexibility, Obsidian also allows Shared references, which can refer to an object that has no owner, and
Unowned references, which refer to an object that may have an owner. These additional options allow users to avoid
establishing ownership structures when none are needed. Unlike Owned and Shared references, Unowned references
cannot be used to change the nominal state that an object is in. This is required for soundness, since a change in state
through an Unowned reference might violate a typestate specification on the owning reference. These annotations
(Owned, Shared, and Unowned) are referred to as permissions because they denote what operations can be done via
references with those annotations.
Although Rust [14] supports a version of ownership, permissions and typestate features have not been included
in popular programming languages, so we lack even qualitative data regarding their broader usability. None of these
aspects has been formally studied in a quantitative user study before, either. In order to gather evidence regarding the
usability of these powerful, but novel and potentially confusing, constructs, we conducted a quantitative user study
comparing Obsidian to Solidity.
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We randomly assigned 20 participants to use either Obsidian or Solidity, taught them their assigned language (with a
tutorial; one example practice question is shown in Fig. 1), and asked them to complete programming tasks. We were
interested in investigating three research questions. First, Obsidian was designed to enable static detection of asset loss
bugs (in which a valuable asset, such as a quantity of cryptocurrency, is lost). We wanted to assess whether the kind of
asset loss bugs that Obsidian detects statically are ones that programmers are likely to insert accidentally when using
Solidity. Second, we wanted to generalize and quantify the previous usability result: can programmers use Obsidian at
all, or does the type system get in the way of doing work [7]? What could we learn about the usability of the key aspects
of the type system: ownership, typestate, and assets? Finally, in many cases, even if programmers can achieve their
goals, strong type systems can impose a usability burden on programmers because the compiler forces programmers
to write code so that the compiler can verify various safety properties. We were interested in comparing Obsidian to
Solidity to see whether the type system in Obsidian imposes a significant burden on programmers as measured by task
completion rates or times.
Prior empirical work in programming language evaluation found that testing and debugging programs in the context
of empirical studies substantially increases variance [8]: different participants have different levels of thoroughness in
writing tests and different levels of debugging skill. When allowed to test and debug, participants frequently spend
large amounts of time debugging issues that are not relevant to the experiment. To focus our participants’ time on
work related to our research questions, we allowed them to edit their code until they were satisfied, but did not give
them an opportunity to test their code. Then, instead of assessing programs on the basis of tests, we inspected their
code. We looked both for specific bugs that corresponded to the research questions we were interested in as well as for
unrelated bugs. This approach was made feasible by the relatively small codebases (see Table 9). Although it is possible
that we missed particular bugs in the code, the same would be true even if we provided unit tests.
Because Obsidian’s design is focused on identifying more bugs at compile time, this approach allowed us to focus
on our research questions about the usability and effectiveness of the type system while using our participants’ time
as effectively as possible. Although some of the bugs that participants inserted might eventually have been found via
testing, the bugs we were looking for are ones that are easy to miss when testing main use cases (as evidenced by their
past deployment in real systems and difficulties observed in past user studies, e.g., [13]).
Although Solidity and Obsidian target different blockchain platforms (Ethereum [15] and Hyperledger Fabric [41],
respectively), we chose Solidity for comparison because it is the dominant programming language used in public smart
contract development and because it is the language that was used to develop popular smart contracts that had serious
security vulnerabilities [21, 34].
In this paper, we describe the first formal, quantitative user study (of which we are aware) of a type system that
supports linear types, ownership, or typestate, or any combination of these together. We found that after a brief
training period (about 90 minutes), most of the Obsidian participants were able to successfully use Obsidian to finish
implementing a small auction program. In contrast, most of the participants who were assigned the Solidity condition
inserted serious bugs involving asset loss. Likewise, most of the Obsidian participants were able to use ownership to fix
a security vulnerability in a prescription-tracking program, which, in contrast, required writing a significant amount
of code in Solidity. However, in a third task, although Obsidian participants were generally able to implement the
requested application, some participants abused the disown operator to allow asset loss. Furthermore, they did not take
full advantage of typestate. This suggests that although ownership types can be used successfully after only a small
amount of training, additional training or language changes may be needed in order for people to take full advantage of
typestate and for people to use the asset-retention guarantee safely.
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2 THE OBSIDIAN LANGUAGE
Obsidian [9] is a class-based object-oriented language that uses a syntax similar to Java. Obsidian uses the keyword
contract instead of class due to conventions on blockchain platforms, and calls methods transactions because
invocations of blockchain code from outside the blockchain have transactional semantics: either the execution finishes
successfully and new state is stored in the blockchain, or the transaction is reverted and any state changes are not
preserved. Currently, Obsidian supports the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain platform [40].
Coblenz et al. provided a full description and formal treatment of Obsidian [9]; here, we explain Obsidian by example.
The left column of Fig. 3 shows part of an Auction contract. An Auction instance is always in one of three states: Open,
BidsMade, or Closed. A field, seller, is always in scope, but when the object is in state BidsMade, fields maxBidder
and maxBid are also in scope. Transactions specify types for their parameters, but in addition to the normal parameters,
when this is specified as the first parameter, the program can specify a type for the this reference. The bid transaction,
for example, can only be invoked via a Shared reference to the receiver. Formal parameters use >> to denote changes in
permission or state. For example, the money parameter of bid is specified with permission Owned >> Unowned, meaning
that the caller must pass an Owned reference, and when bid returns, from the perspective of the caller, the money is now
Unowned. In other words, ownership was passed from the caller to the transaction.
Dynamic state tests, via the in operator, check the dynamic state of a referenced object. For example, line 18 checks
to see if this is in state Open. If the test passes, lines 21-22 initialize the maxBidder and maxBid fields of the BidsMade
state, to which the object transitions on line 23. Line 22 transfers ownership of an object initially referenced by money
to the maxBid field, leaving money with type Money@Unowned.
Fields can temporarily have types that differ from their declarations as long as by the end of the transaction, all fields
have types consistent with their declarations. For example, line 31 returns the money from the previous maxBidder
which causes field maxBid to temporarily have type Money@Unowned; this is corrected on line 33, which transfers
ownership from money to maxBid.
The revert statement (line 39) discards all changes that have been made to state in the transaction and reports an
error.
3 THE SOLIDITY LANGUAGE
Solidity [16], like Obsidian, is a class-based object-oriented language. Solidity targets the Ethereum blockchain plat-
form [15]. The function keyword denotes methods, though methods have transactional semantics. It has no built-in
notion of states, but programs can declare enums and use them to represent states. Solidity supports a built-in cryptocur-
rency called ether. Functions that are annotated payable can receive quantities of ether; the ether is conceptually sent
with the invocation, and the amount is stored in the variable msg.value. Each contract instance can own a quantity
of ether; this quantity is automatically updated by the runtime when a function receives a payment. Every contract
instance is stored on the blockchain at a particular address. The language has a built-in type called address to represent
these addresses.
Programs typically implement their own fine-grained accounting mechanism. For example, the pendingReturns
structure records how much money is owed to each of a number of addresses. Without this mapping, although the
contract would still record how much ether it held, the implementation would not be able to track for whom it is being
kept.
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The pendingReturns mapping supports the withdrawal pattern [18], which is an Ethereum coding convention that
protects against re-entrancy attacks. The possibility of attacks arises because sending ether to a contract can cause
the recipient to execute arbitrary code: the recipient can invoke a function on the sender, to which there is already
an invocation on the stack. This is dangerous if the funds were sent while the sender was in an inconsistent state.
Instead, it is recommended that contracts merely record that they owe ether to the intended recipient and provide a
withdraw function that recipients can call to retrieve their money. The withdrawal pattern is not used in Obsidian,
since Obsidian targets Hyperledger Fabric, which does not have this vulnerability. Because this was a summative study
of the programming environments that users would encounter when using each language, we expected participants
to use the withdrawal pattern with Solidity and not with Obsidian. If Obsidian were used with Ethereum, we expect
Obsidian’s asset-based approach would guard against bugs in using the withdrawal pattern, regardless whether the
opportunity for it arises from the platform design or the particular API being used.
4 PARTICIPANTS
We recruited participants to our four-hour study with posters at our university, with emails to lists of appropriate degree
programs (such as the Master of Software Engineering program), and by advertising to students in relevant courses
(e.g., a software engineering course). The protocol was approved by the university IRB. We compensated participants
with a $75 Amazon gift card.
We pre-screened participants with an online survey that asked them basic Java questions; we invited respondents
who answered five of six questions correctly to participate in the study. Table 1 summarizes the previous experience of
the experiment participants in each condition. Overall, 14 of the participants identified as male, and six as female. We
excluded an additional participant who took too long on the training phase1.
Solidity Obsidian
Programming experience, years 8.6 5.0
Professional experience, years 1.8 1.8
Java experience, years 2.4 2.2
Table 1. Participant experience. N=10 in each condition.
5 TRAINING
We provided a web-based tutorial (implemented with Qualtrics) for their assigned condition2, which stepped them
through web-based documentation and exercises. Some of the exercises were to be completed in Visual Studio Code,
which was configured with a compiler for their assigned language. Some of the questions were multiple-choice; for these,
the tool automatically showed participants if they had entered an incorrect answer. An experimenter was available to
answer questions. Participants were told that they should try to get all of their questions addressed during the training
phase, since no questions could be answered after training was completed.
1That participant spent 3 hours and 11 minutes on the tutorial, which was three standard deviations above the mean.
2The tutorial materials are included in the supplement.
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Fig. 2. An example from the web-based Obsidian tutorial.
We included practice questions in the tutorial to ensure that participants absorbed the material (prior studies had
found that without practice questions, participants skimmed the material without mastering the concepts). Fig. 1 shows
an example practice question. Fig. 2 shows a sample from the Obsidian documentation.
To make the two experimental conditions as similar as possible, even though Solidity includes no support for
ownership, typestate, or assets, Solidity participants received a tutorial that explained these concepts and recommended
using comment-based annotations. If participants asked about the utility of these annotations, we argued that this was
similar to how one might write preconditions or postconditions in comments. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of
times participants spent on the tutorial in the two conditions.
Solidity Obsidian
Average (standard deviation) 86 (28) min. 98 (31) min.
Range 39 to 138 min. 50 to 148 min.
Table 2. Training times in Solidity and Obsidian conditions.
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6 AUCTION TASK
In the Auction task, we asked participants to fill in missing code in an implementation of an English auction, in which
bids are made openly and the highest bidder wins. To increase external validity, we modeled the task after a Solidity
example [19]. We required that all bids be accompanied by funds to ensure that the winning bidder will pay for the item.
When a bid is exceeded, the original bidder should receive a refund of their bid. We gave the participants 30 minutes to
complete the task.
Fig. 3 shows the bid transaction that was provided to participants as well as a sample solution. In the first subtask,
marked by // 1. TODO, participants needed to write code to refund the existing bid to the previous bidder, whose
address was stored in maxBidder, and record the new bid (money). In the second subtask (// 2. TODO), participants
needed to refund the bid to the bidder. The code in yellow shows a correct answer. In both cases, there was an opportunity
for asset loss: if participants overwrote the old Money reference (stored in maxBid), then the old bid would be lost. In
Obsidian, the compiler would report an error if this happened; in Solidity, there was no protection against that mistake.
RQ A.1: Overall, do more participants complete the Auction task correctly with Obsidian than with Solidity?
RQ A.2: How frequently do Solidity participants accidentally lose assets in the Auction task?
6.1 Results and Discussion
Table 3 summarizes the results of the Auction task; errors are shown in Table 4. Nine Solidity participants said they
were done with the task before the 30 minutes expired; among these nine, the average time was 12 minutes. Eight
Obsidian participants said they were done with the task before running out of time; among these eight, the average time
was also 12 minutes. Overall, two participants completed the task correctly in the Solidity condition; seven completed
the task correctly in the Obsidian condition. The difference, summarized in the first two rows of Table 3, is statistically
significant, with p ≈ .015 (Fisher’s exact test; odds ratio 0.053). We conclude for RQ A.1 that participants who finished
were more likely to finish correctly if they used Obsidian than if they used Solidity. We did not observe a significant
difference in completion times across the two groups.
Of the two Obsidian participants who did not finish the Auction task in time, one was confused about the semantics of
the :: field initialization operator, attempting to use BidsMade::maxBid to refer to the current value of the maxBid field
rather than the future value after a state transition. This misconception led to a compiler error that the participant did
not find helpful. The other participant also received a confusing error message: although the code invoked a transaction
that did not exist, the error message pertained to ownership of the transaction’s parameter. A more mature compiler
might have helped the participant finish the task.
In subtask 1 (starting at line 29 in Fig. 3), participants needed to record the new bid and refund the old bid. We
found the following errors among the Solidity participants who said they were done:
(1) Loss of previous refunds: the correct implementation added the new refund to any prior refund. Four participants
used = instead of +=, overwriting any old refund (in line 31).
(2) Omission of refund: three participants neglected to refund the previous bid (e.g., omitting line 31).
All eight of the Obsidian participants who said they were done did so without losing any assets, since otherwise the
compiler would have given an error. However, one participant refunded the old money to the new bidder instead of the
previous bidder.
While doing the task, two of the Obsidian participants received a compiler error indicating that they had lost an
asset. For example:
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1 main asset contract Auction {
2 Participant@Unowned seller;
3
4 state Open;
5 state BidsMade {
6 // the bidder who made the highest bid so far
7 Participant@Unowned maxBidder;
8 Money@Owned maxBid;
9 }
10 state Closed;
11
12 . . .
13
14
15 transaction bid(Auction@Shared this ,
16 Money@Owned >> Unowned money ,
17 Participant@Unowned bidder) {
18 if (this in Open) {
19 // Initialize destination state ,
20 // and then transition to it.
21 BidsMade :: maxBidder = bidder;
22 BidsMade :: maxBid = money;
23 ->BidsMade;
24 }
25 else {
26 if (this in BidsMade) {
27 //if the newBid is higher than the current Bid
28 if (money.getAmount () > maxBid.getAmount ()) {
29 //1. TODO: fill this in.
30 // You may call any other transactions as needed.
31 maxBidder.receivePayment(maxBid );
32 maxBidder = bidder;
33 maxBid = money;
34 }
35 else {
36 //2. TODO: return the money to the bidder ,
37 // since the new bid wasn 't high enough.
38 //You may call any other transactions as needed.
39 bidder.receivePayment(money);
40 }
41 }
42 else {
43 revert ("Can only make a bid on an open auction.");
44 }
45 }
46 }
47 }
Obsidian condition.
contract Auction {
// the bidder who made the highest bid so far
address maxBidder;
uint maxBidAmount;
// 'payable ' indicates we can transfer money to this address
address payable seller;
// Allow withdrawing previous money for bids that were outbid
mapping(address => uint) pendingReturns;
enum State { Open , BidsMade , Closed }
State state;
. . .
function bid() public payable {
if (state == State.Open) {
maxBidder = msg.sender;
maxBidAmount = msg.value;
state = State.BidsMade;
}
else {
if (state == State.BidsMade) {
//if the newBid is higher than the current Bid
if (msg.value > maxBidAmount) {
//1. TODO: fill this in.
// You may call any other functions as needed.
pendingReturns[maxBidder] += maxBidAmount;
maxBidder = msg.sender;
maxBidAmount = msg.value;
}
else {
//2. TODO: return the newBid money to the bidder ,
// since the newBid wasn 't high enough.
//You may call any other functions as needed.
pendingReturns[msg.sender] += msg.value;
}
}
else {
revert ("Can only make a bid on an open auction.");
}
}
}
}
Solidity condition.
Fig. 3. Code for the two Auction tasks. Code highlighted in yellow represents a correct solution; the rest was given to participants as
starter code.
auction.obs 37.28: Variable 'maxBid' is an owning reference to an asset, so it cannot
be overwritten.
Both of these participants successfully fixed the error.
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Solidity (N = 10) Obsidian (N = 10)
Completed task correctly 2 7
Completed task with bugs 7 1
Time in min., completed tasks only (standard deviation) 12 (6.9) 12 (7.13)
Did not complete the task 1 2
Table 3. Auction task results.
Solidity (N = 10) Obsidian (N = 10)
Ran out of time 1 2
Lost an asset in either subtask 7 0
Subtask 1
omitted refund of old bid 3 0
overwrote old refund 4 0
refunded to wrong bidder 0 1
Subtask 2
overwrote old refund 4 0
refunded via transfer() instead of pendingReturns 4 N/A
Table 4. Errors in Auction task.
In subtask 2 (starting at line 39 of Fig. 3), participants needed to refund the new bid, since it was not larger than the
previous bid. Among the nine Solidity participants who said they finished the task, two refunded the bid properly (using
pendingReturns); four refunded via transfer, which would not have resulted in asset loss but was inconsistent with
the documentation we gave them; four attempted to refund via pendingReturns but, as in the first subtask, overwrote
any previous refund, potentially losing money.
One might argue that the potential for asset loss due to improper use of pendingReturns was due to the need to
use the withdrawal pattern [18], as discussed above. However, the particular bug we observed was due to participants
overwriting an integer rather than adding to it, and we infer that arithmetic errors are likely commonwhenmanipulating
assets manually. Obsidian protects against these bugs by using assets to represent money.
We conclude (RQ A.2) that asset loss was frequent among Solidity users, and more frequent than among Obsidian
users, who did not lose any assets (p ≈ .002, Fisher’s exact test).
7 PRESCRIPTION TASK
We gave participants a short Pharmacy contract (43 lines in Obsidian or 46 lines in Solidity including whitespace). The
code included an example to show how the contract was vulnerable to attack. Although a Prescription was specified
to only permit a fixed number of refills, a Patient could invoke depositPrescription on more than one Pharmacy
object, resulting in the patient being able to refill the prescription the given number of times at each pharmacy. We
asked participants to fix the bug, avoiding runtime checks if possible. In Solidity, for example, depositPrescription
had the signature below:
function deposit(Prescription p) public returns (int);
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In Obsidian, the starter code provided this signature:
transaction deposit(Prescription@Shared p) returns int;
In Obsidian, it sufficed for participants to change the signature so that the Pharmacy acquired ownership of the
prescription object:
transaction deposit(Prescription@Owned >> Unowned p)
returns int;
In Solidity, in contrast, since there is no static feature that would make the above safe, participants had to implement
a global tracking mechanism across all Pharmacy objects.
The task was based on a task from a prior study, which found that users of an earlier version of Obsidian had great
difficulty using ownership to fix this problem [7]. For example, some participants in that study thought about ownership
in a dynamic way (for example, writing if statements to test ownership) or were confused about when ownership was
transferred between references. The version of the language used in the present study includes changes that resulted
from that work, such as fusing typestate and ownership in the language syntax, making ownership transfer explicit
in transaction signatures, and removing local variable ownership annotations. Our research questions were centered
around evaluating the revised language:
RQ P.1: How effectively could Obsidian participants use ownership to fix the multiple-deposit vulnerability?
RQ P.2: Does using ownership to prevent the multiple-deposit vulnerability take less time than using a traditional
dynamic approach?
We gave participants 35 minutes to complete the task. Because ownership-based approaches are not checked by the
Solidity compiler, Solidity participants who proposed ownership approaches were permitted to continue working in the
remaining time.
7.1 Results
Table 5 summarizes the results. Regarding RQ P.1, six of the ten Obsidian participants successfully used ownership to
solve the problem. Although the previous study [7] was not quantitative, based on the data from that study, we believe
this is a substantial improvement. The dynamic Obsidian solution that we judged to be correct tracked global state by
making Prescription mutable, despite a comment indicating that Prescription should be immutable.
Five of the ten Solidity participants tried to use ownership, even though Solidity does not check ownership. Only three
of the Solidity participants said that they were done within the time limit, and of those, only two had a correct solution.
The incorrect Solidity solution attempted to solve the problem by making Prescription mutable to track remaining
refills globally, but in addition, although the participant tried to track the number of refills across all pharmacies, the
code did not update the global number of refills when refilling a prescription.
Regarding RQ P.2, we did not observe a significant difference in completion times. However, due to the small amount
of code required for the static solution, we suspect that there is a significant learning effect to be leveraged here, and
the participants who succeeded could likely do so again in a similar situation much faster.
7.2 Discussion
One might have expected that applying ownership would be challenging, since the concept was new to the participants,
but since only half of those who said they had completed a dynamic solution had correct solutions, it would appear that
using the new static construct may not be harder than writing global state tracking code. In fact, using ownership to
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Solidity (N = 10) Obsidian (N = 10)
Attempted a static solution 5 6
Correct static solution N/A 6
Attempted a dynamic solution 6 3
Correct dynamic solution 2 1
Made Prescription mutable 2 1
Completed within time limit 3 9
Time among participants who did not run out of time 22 (3) min. 25 (12) min.
Table 5. Summary of Prescription task results. Times are shown as mean (standard deviation).
solve programming problems is teachable: six of nine Obsidian participants who completed the task used ownership to
do so; we expect that the remaining three could be taught to do so with additional practice.
Security experts have long argued in favor of immutable data structures [30, 32], which is one reason why we
specified that Prescription was immutable. However, these results point out that this approach may not be tenable:
specifications of immutability may be ignored or removed, and attempts to maintain immutability require substantial
work, which may itself be bug-prone. Indeed, when language-based mechanisms do not provide the required safety
properties [8], it may be safer and cheaper to use a mutable design than to bear the cost of immutability.
The benefits of Obsidian’s ownership system in the Prescription task contrast with the benefits of other kinds of
ownership. For example, ownership in Rust [29] introduces constraints on mutation. However, in Rust, only owning
references can mutate objects, whereas in Obsidian, only modification of nominal state is restricted, and then only
through Unowned references. In Obsidian, mutation is restricted only as much as is needed to provide sound typestate
specifications, since concurrency is not a concern. Likewise, ownership types are sometimes used for expressing
encapsulation [3, 5], in which case restricting mutation is also not relevant. A significant fraction of participants were
able to use the linear aspects of ownership alone in the Prescription task, suggesting that languages that adopt just
linearity (and not mutability restrictions) may be usable.
Ownership is typically understood to be one of the more challenging aspects of learning Rust [44]. Our usability
results for Obsidian suggest that perhaps by integrating a more flexible permissions system, languages such as Rust
could be made more convenient for common cases, and thus have a more gradual learning curve.
Although a majority of the Obsidian participants used ownership successfully, four participants did not. One of the
four participants did not complete any of the three tasks. Another “fixed” the issue by modifying code in Patient that
we had provided as an example of how a nefarious patient might exploit the bug; perhaps this participant did not really
understand the task. The other two seemed to need more time studying ownership in order to use it effectively.
The instructions included: “Please use what you have learned today to fix this problem (avoiding runtime checks if
possible).” Perhaps as a result, a similar fraction of participants tried to use ownership in both conditions. We wanted
to encourage the Obsidian participants to use ownership so that we could assess to what extent they could use it
effectively, but perhaps the instructions persuaded some of the Solidity participants to use it even though doing so was
not checked by the compiler.
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8 CASINO TASK
Nine Solidity and five Obsidian participants completed the Casino task. We excluded one Obsidian participant who
should have received an error from the compiler but, due to a bug, did not. We excluded one Solidity participant and
four Obsidian participants who did not have enough of their four hours remaining, and in the time available, did not
feel they had finished the task. This left nine Solidity participants and five Obsidian participants.
The results of a comparison between conditions on this task may be biased because the Obsidian participants who
were included for analysis in this task are those who completed the earlier tasks fastest. As a result, the Obsidian
programmers may have been stronger programmers on average than those in the Solidity condition (in which almost
all the participants had time to try the task).
Casino was more open-ended than the other tasks, resulting in more variance, as participants made varying
implementation choices. Given this, the small numbers, and the potential bias, rather than focusing on a statistical
analysis, we use this primarily an opportunity to develop hypotheses and design insights.
We gave participants a web page with a diagram showing invocations that needed to be supported (Fig. 4). The web
page included a list of requirements:
(1) If a Bettor predicts the outcome correctly, the Bettor gets twice the Money they put down. For example, if
Bettor b puts down 5 tokens on the correct outcome, they should receive 10 tokens after the Game is played.
(2) If the Bettor predicted incorrectly, the Casino keeps their tokens.
(3) Bets can only be made before the Game starts.
(4) Winnings can only be distributed after the Game is finished.
(5) Bettors must collect winnings themselves from the Casino after a Game by calling code, which you need to
write. Until winnings are collected, the Casino keeps track of them.
(6) A Bettor can have one active bet per game. If a Bettor bets more than once, their original bet should be replaced
by the new one and any previous bet should be refunded.
(7) A BettorMUST put down tokens at the same time that they’re making a Bet.
(8) If the Casino does not have enough tokens available to pay out winnings, the invocation to collect winnings can
fail.
We provided starter code for Casino, Game, and Bet. Obsidian participants also received implementations of appro-
priate containers (Solidity has built-in containers that participants could use).
We used the Casino task to investigate four research questions:
RQ C.1: To what extent do Obsidian participants leverage typestate in transaction signatures to avoid dynamic
checks?
RQ C.2: In both versions, programs represented funds with Token objects. Does Obsidian’s type system help
participants avoid losing Token objects compared with Solidity?
RQ C.3: Do Obsidian participants view Token objects as resources that should not be created or destroyed, or as
data, which could be created and destroyed as needed?
RQ C.4: How do task completion times compare between Solidity and Obsidian participants?
8.1 Results and Discussion
One participant in the Obsidian condition gave up after 1 hour, 15 minutes. That participant had chosen an unnecessarily
difficult implementation strategy, requiring implementing a new container (implemented as a linked list). Also, the
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Fig. 4. Sequence diagram given to participants to show what operations the Casino contract should support.
participant delayed trying to compile until after writing a lot of code, resulting in a large collection of compiler errors.
The remaining four Obsidian participants all wrote code that compiled successfully. One participant in the Solidity
condition gave up after 39 minutes, having received a parser error that they were not sure how to fix.
Regarding RQ C.1, we had expected that some participants would define states in Casino to correspond with the
states in Game (BeforePlay, Playing, FinishedPlaying). By doing so, they could avoid dynamic state checks that
would otherwise be needed to implement requirements 3 and 4. Instead, all five of the Obsidian participants wrote code
in the corresponding Casino transactions to check the current state of the Game. The participant who gave up tried to
check the state with a static assertion, evidently not understanding that the assertion was static, not dynamic.
The lack of usage of static state information is unfortunate because it represents a missed opportunity to rule out
bugs in calling code. Perhaps more-experienced programmers would be more interested in leveraging this language
feature; alternatively, it might require more training or a more-convenient language design. The design the participants
chose may have been best given their incentives; the typestate-based approach would have required adding more
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structure to reflect the typestate relationships between Casino and Game. However, motivated by the results of this
study, we hope to consider future language design changes that make typestate coupling of different objects convenient.
The results here contrast with the results from the Auction task, in which participants did leverage state constructs
that were already present. Perhaps creating new interfaces that use novel verification-related features (such as typestate)
is harder than consuming them, in which case further research should consider novel ways of scaffolding interface
design and creation.
Surprisingly, in RQ C.2, we observe that in fact, Solidity participants were probably more likely to have the casino
keep tokens when a bet is lost (Table 7, p ≈ 0.09, Fisher’s exact test). Likewise, Solidity participants may be more likely
to successfully issue refunds for bets after the first bet (p ≈ 0.33, Fisher’s exact test). We believe this is related to abuse
of disown by Obsidian participants.
Three Obsidian participants who finished the Casino task used disown improperly to throw away assets. We found
this surprising, since we had warned the participants against improper use of disown. The tutorial included an example
of how disown might be needed inside the implementation of a Money contract, and wrote below the example:
IMPORTANT: disown should be used only when you really want to throw something out. Above, disown
is required because of the manual arithmetic used to manipulate amount inside the implementation of
Money, but it is not needed in most normal code.
It would not have sufficed to remove disown from the language; in addition to the fact that it is needed in certain
(rare) cases, programmers could build a Trash contract to hold discarded objects, thus suppressing any errors the
compiler would emit. We have several hypotheses regarding why disown was abused:
• Some participants may have used disown to silence the compiler when they felt they had a correct solution. One
participant discarded the old wager, using money from the casino’s pot to pay out bets. The participant also
disowned the bet when a losing bettor tried to retrieve their winnings (a correct solution would have put the
tokens in the casino’s pot).
• Some participants may not have read or understood the tutorial’s warning about disown; in retrospect, we should
have assessed understanding explicitly.
• Some participants did not sufficiently understand the notion of assets. For example, when disbursing winnings,
one solution disowned the previous wager and created new Tokens when needed, rather than reusing the tokens
from the wager.
• Some participants may have used disown as a workaround for an unsolved problem. In code to accept a new bet,
one participant disowned any previous bet by that bettor, and then wrote: // Currently just throws the
bettor’s money away and hopes they find it eventually.
This motivates a question for future research to characterize the use of these escape hatch constructs, which can
be used in both safe and dangerous ways. Some languages include warnings in the names of such constructs, as in
unsafePerformIO in Haskell [25], but such approaches may not be effective in explaining the danger.
Risk compensation [11] refers to the idea that people compensate for safety features by taking additional risks. For
example, drivers may drive faster when wearing seat belts. Further study is needed to consider the question of whether
risk compensation occurs with strong type systems. Perhaps some participants who used disown assumed that if there
were a bug, the compiler would report it.
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We hope that showing how we identified usability problems with Obsidian in this study will show others how they
might do so for other languages. As another example, a study might have identified NULL as a design error before it
became a common feature [23].
Regarding RQ C.3, all four of the participants who wrote solutions that compiled treated tokens as data rather than
assets, i.e., at some point in their code, they either created new tokens or disowned tokens. The Obsidian participant
who gave up did not do either of those things, likely viewing tokens more as assets, but became mired in a list of type
errors. We conclude that use of assets was likely not natural for our participants. This interpretation is consistent with
the post-study survey results (§8), in which we observed that participants said they felt ownership and states were
more useful than assets.
For RQ C.4, Obsidian participants spent significantly longer on the Casino task than Solidity participants did
(p ≈ 0.02, Mann-Whitney U test, d ≈ 1.9). Therefore, the stronger type system provided by Obsidian likely has a
significant cost in development time. We hypothesize that this cost is greater with more open-ended tasks, which would
explain why we did not observe this difference in the two prior tasks. Of course, the additional cost may be worthwhile
since Obsidian rules out some classes of bugs statically, particularly when used by skilled programmers who do not
abuse disown.
Solidity (N = 10) Obsidian (N = 10)
Had enough time to try Casino 9 5
Completed Casino with a program that compiled 8 4
Table 6. Summary of Casino task completions.
Solidity (N = 8) Obsidian (N = 4)
Casino keeps tokens when a bet is lost 8 2
Bettor’s extra bets result in refunds 8 3
Mean completion time 37 min. 64 min.
Table 7. Summary of Casino task results among completed programs that compiled.
9 POST-STUDY SURVEY RESULTS
We conducted a post-study survey asking participants about their opinions. Several of the Solidity participants expected
that the language would have included constructs for states or ownership. For example, one participant wrote in the
post-study survey:
It also seemed like there should be some syntactic sugar for writing things like:
enum State { Foo , Bar , Buzz }
State s
since they are so common.
Three Solidity participants expected that the compiler would check ownership. For example:
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Solidity
(N=6)
Obsidian
(N=8)
How much did you like the language you used? 3.7 (0.82) 4.0 (0.53)
How well do you feel you understand the concept of ownership? 3.8 (0.98) 3.75 (0.99)
*How useful do you think ownership is? 3.0 (1.1) 4.88 (0.36)
*How well do you feel you understand the concept of states? 4.8 (0.41) 4.1 (0.64)
How useful do you think states are? 4.3 (0.81) 4.1 (0.64)
How well do you feel you understand the concept of assets? 3.2 (0.98) 3.4 (1.3)
How useful do you think assets are? 2.7 (0.52) 3 (1.2)
Table 8. Perceptions of ownership, states, and assets. Cells show average (standard deviation). * indicates that a Mann-Whitney U
test shows a significant difference at p < 0.05.
On [semantics] — I was hoping ownership / assets / states would be statically verified. When I wrote code
during the 2nd phase of the study, I found that I didn’t really document ownerships / asset status.
Similarly, from another Solidity participant:
I think it would be nice to have some static analysis to check ownership information rather than relying
on the programmer to have good comments documenting ownership because in practice documentation
is never perfect and often overlooked.
Participants using Obsidian had differing opinions regarding how easy it was to learn. One wrote:
The tutorial and the exercises are well-written and they helped me a lot in understanding the concepts of
new language!
Another Obsidian participant wrote:
The smaller coding exercises were nice to follow and complete. The open-ended part was a little over-
whelming to finish, for somebody that just got introduced to new concepts of ownership, states and
assets.
One Obsidian participant commented on how ownership seemed natural after some practice:
. . . the general concepts of ownership [were] a little unintuitive but after working with the language they
started to make more sense and seem more natural. . . .
We asked participants (on a 5-point scale) how well they understood particular concepts and how useful they thought
those concepts were. The results from participants who completed the survey before being de-briefed from the study are
summarized in Table 8. Although the Obsidian participants said they thought ownership was significantly more useful
than the Solidity participants did (p ≈ 0.002, d ≈ 2.5), the Solidity participants indicated that they felt they understood
states better (p ≈ 0.04, d ≈ 1.3). Perhaps the existence of an unfamiliar state construct in Obsidian, or the unfamiliarity
of the relationship between states and types, led to less confidence. There was no significant difference in views of the
utility of states. This may be due to the tasks we gave, which did not particularly rely on the static aspects of states.
We also compared across questions. Obsidian participants said that they felt both ownership and states were more
useful than assets (p ≈ .0027, d ≈ 2.1 and p ≈ .037, d ≈ 1.2, respectively, according to a Mann-Whitney U test and
Cohen’s d). The differences between perceptions of understanding between ownership and assets and between states
and assets were not significant at p < .05. Of course, perceptions of understand and utility were influenced by the
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Solidity (N = 10) Obsidian (N = 10)
Min Max Min Max
Auction 291 355 352 395
Prescription 455 570 457 518
Casino 257 425 135 416
Table 9. Ranges of solution lengths in lines of code.
particular tasks the participants did and their perceived success at doing those tasks, but these results correspond with
the Obsidian participants’ failure to regard tokens as assets in the Casino task.
10 LIMITATIONS
The student participants may not be representative of the population of smart contract programmers. However, since
most of the students had some professional experience, they were likely representative of entry-level programmers in
industry [35]. The tasks were more constrained than real-world programming tasks, although smart contracts tend to
be small in practice, averaging 322 lines [28]. Table 9 describes solution lengths in our study.
The participants were new to the programming languages and to smart contract development in general, so it is
possible that experienced programmers would have behaved differently. Although we tried to infer how particular
aspects of the languages and their type systems affected participants’ behavior and performance, because this was
a summative study, the results may have been influenced other aspects of the experience, such as the way in which
different aspects of the type systems interacted or the details of the particular tasks we gave participants.
11 RELATEDWORK
Other programming languages were designed to improve smart contract safety. Flint [31] is a typestate-oriented
language that supports linear assets. Pact [24] is Turing-incomplete, avoiding nonterminating behavior. Scilla [33] is an
intermediate language whose semantics were formalized in Coq; it represents programs as communicating automata,
avoiding complex inter-contract transactions (instead requiring that these be implemented as continuations). None of
the above languages were evaluated empirically.
Delmolino et al. [13] described a user study of Serpent, which was a precursor to Solidity, showing several classes of
bugs that occurred in the lab. Among these was asset loss, which motivated our study to see whether our participants
would avoid these bugs when using Obsidian.
Coblenz et al. argued for using a variety of methods when designing programming languages [6]. Stefik and
Hanenberg focused on the need for empirical evaluation of programming languages [36]. For example, Stefik et al.
developed methodology to evaluate syntax choices for novice programmers [37]. Hanenberg et al. compared static and
dynamic type systems [22], finding benefits of static type systems in both documentation and compile-time checking.
Uesbeck et al. evaluated the benefit of C++ lambdas [42], finding that no benefit even for the purposes for which
lambdas were created. The only other quantitative empirical studies we are aware of for complete, novel programming
languages (as opposed to ones that were already familiar to the participants) were of Quorum [37] and HANDS [26].
Other work has focused on language extensions, such as for software transactional memory [27] and immutability [8].
Several languages have integrated support for linearity. Wadler [43] proposed the use of linear types for programming
languages. In functional languages, linearity may take the form of session types [4]. This approach mirrors typestate,
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since channel types (expressed as session types) change as messages are sent through them. Typestate was originally
proposed by Strom and Yemini [38], but more recent work by DeLine, Aldrich, Bierhoff, and others describes how
object-oriented languages can be used with typestate [1, 2, 12]. Garcia et al. gave a formalization of typestate [20]. None
of the these languages were empirically evaluated with users. Coblenz et al. designed Obsidian [9] using user-centered
design [7]; this paper focuses not on the design or design methodology but on an empirical comparison between
Obsidian and Solidity.
12 FUTUREWORK
Casino, which included significant use of nominal states, resulted in Obsidian participants writing dynamic checks.
Future work should investigate the extent to which typestate, as provided in Obsidian and other typestate-oriented
languages, can be made more compelling for programmers. For example, when pairs of objects have states that are
coupled, the language could provide features to make representing and using this relationship convenient. Likewise,
the existence of risk compensation [11] among programmers should be investigated in future studies.
A study that included testing and debugging would be more representative of real-world use. Also, the participants
were new to the language they used in the study. In a study of experienced Obsidian and Solidity programmers, we
hypothesize that the task completion time difference would diminish significantly but not disappear, and the Obsidian
users would take more advantage of Obsidian’s security features.
13 CONCLUSION
As programming languages are tools for empowering programmers, empirical methods offer an opportunity for
designers to provide evidence of the benefits of their work. For instance, in our study, we showed that ownership alone
can be used effectively with a short training period, that assets can be used to detect bugs that would otherwise likely
be inserted, and that typestate may need additional training or refinement to be used effectively by some programmers.
Although few language designs have been evaluated in this way, our work shows that it is possible to empirically
evaluate a novel language, to both support hypotheses of usability as well as identify areas for potential improvement.
We also hope that our findings of usability for the less-common type system features we analyzed will lead to more
adoption of safer, more sophisticated type systems in future languages.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the many anonymous participants in our experiments. This material is based upon work
supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants CNS-1423054 and CCF-1814826, by the U.S. Department of
Defense, and by Ripple. In addition, the first author is supported by an IBM PhD Fellowship. Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Science Foundation.
REFERENCES
[1] Jonathan Aldrich, Joshua Sunshine, Darpan Saini, and Zachary Sparks. 2009. Typestate-oriented Programming. In Companion of Object Oriented
Programming Systems, Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA ’09). https://doi.org/10.1145/1639950.1640073
[2] Kevin Bierhoff and Jonathan Aldrich. 2007. Modular Typestate Checking of Aliased Objects. In Object-oriented programming systems, languages, and
applications (OOPSLA ’07). https://doi.org/10.1145/1297027.1297050
[3] Chandrasekhar Boyapati, Robert Lee, and Martin Rinard. 2002. Ownership types for safe programming: preventing data races and deadlocks.
Object-oriented programming, systems, languages, and applications (2002). https://doi.org/10.1145/583854.582440
18
An Empirical Study of the Obsidian Smart Contract Language
[4] Luís Caires and Frank Pfenning. 2010. Session types as intuitionistic linear propositions. In International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR
’10). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15375-4_16
[5] David G. Clarke, John M. Potter, and James Noble. 1998. Ownership Types for Flexible Alias Protection. In Object-oriented Programming, Systems,
Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA ’98). https://doi.org/10.1145/286936.286947
[6] Michael Coblenz, Jonathan Aldrich, Brad A. Myers, and Joshua Sunshine. 2018. Interdisciplinary Programming Language Design. In Symposium on
New Ideas, New Paradigms, and Reflections on Programming and Software (Onward! ’18). https://doi.org/10.1145/3276954.3276965
[7] Michael Coblenz, Gauri Kambhatla, Paulette Koronkevich, Jenna L. Wise, Celeste Barnaby, Joshua Sunshine, Jonathan Aldrich, and Brad A. Myers.
2019. Usability Methods for Designing Programming Languages for Software Engineers. arXiv:1912.04719
[8] Michael Coblenz, Whitney Nelson, Jonathan Aldrich, Brad Myers, and Joshua Sunshine. 2017. Glacier: Transitive Class Immutability for Java. In
International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ’17). IEEE Press.
[9] Michael Coblenz, Reed Oei, Tyler Etzel, Paulette Koronkevich, Miles Baker, Yannick Bloem, Brad A. Myers, Joshua Sunshine, and Jonathan Aldrich.
2019. Obsidian: Typestate and Assets for Safer Blockchain Programming. In Submission (2019). arXiv:1909.03523
[10] Michael Coblenz, Joshua Sunshine, Jonathan Aldrich, and Brad A. Myers. 2019. Smarter Smart Contract Development Tools. 2nd International
Workshop on Emerging Trends in Software Engineering for Blockchain. https://doi.org/10.1109/WETSEB.2019.00013
[11] Wikipedia Contributors. 2020. Risk Compensation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation
[12] Robert DeLine and Manuel Fähndrich. 2004. Typestates for Objects. In European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP ’04).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24851-4_21
[13] Kevin Delmolino, Mitchell Arnett, Ahmed Kosba, Andrew Miller, and Elaine Shi. 2016. Step by step towards creating a safe smart contract: Lessons
and insights from a cryptocurrency lab. In International conference on financial cryptography and data security. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-
53357-4_6
[14] The Rust Project Developers. 2017. What is Ownership? (2017). Retrieved November 15, 2017 from https://doc.rust-lang.org/book/second-
edition/ch04-01-what-is-ownership.html
[15] Ethereum Foundation. 2020. Ethereum Project. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from http://www.ethereum.org
[16] Ethereum Foundation. 2020. Solidity. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/
[17] Ethereum Foundation. 2020. State Machine. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.4.24/common-patterns.html#state-
machine
[18] Ethereum Foundation. 2020. Withdrawal from Contracts. Retrieved February 25, 2020 from https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.6.3/common-
patterns.html#withdrawal-from-contracts
[19] Ethereum Foundation. 2020. Simple Open Auction. https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.6.3/solidity-by-example.html#simple-open-auction
[20] Ronald Garcia, Éric Tanter, Roger Wolff, and Jonathan Aldrich. 2014. Foundations of Typestate-Oriented Programming. ACM Trans. on Programming
Languages and Systems 36, 4, Article 12 (Oct 2014), 44 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2629609
[21] Luke Graham. 2017. $32 million worth of digital currency ether stolen by hackers. Retrieved November 2, 2017 from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/
07/20/32-million-worth-of-digital-currency-ether-stolen-by-hackers.html
[22] Stefan Hanenberg, Sebastian Kleinschmager, Romain Robbes, Éric Tanter, and Andreas Stefik. 2014. An empirical study on the impact of static
typing on software maintainability. Empirical Software Engineering 19, 5 (oct 2014), 1335–1382. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10664-013-9289-1
[23] C. A. R. Hoare. 2009. Null References: The Billion Dollar Mistake. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://www.infoq.com/presentations/Null-
References-The-Billion-Dollar-Mistake-Tony-Hoare/
[24] Kadena. 2019. PACT. https://pact.kadena.io
[25] The University of Glasgow. 2001. System.IO.Unsafe. https://hackage.haskell.org/package/base-4.12.0.0/docs/System-IO-Unsafe.html
[26] John F. Pane, Brad A. Myers, and Leah B. Miller. 2002. Using HCI techniques to design a more usable programming system. In Human Centric
Computing Languages and Environments (HCC ’02).
[27] Victor Pankratius and Ali-Reza Adl-Tabatabai. 2014. Software engineering with transactional memory versus locks in practice. Theory of Computing
Systems 55, 3 (2014), 555–590.
[28] Andrea Pinna, Simona Ibba, Gavina Baralla, Roberto Toonelli, and Michele Marchesi. 2019. A Massive Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts
Empirical Study and Code Metrics. IEEE Access 7 (2019).
[29] Mozilla Research. 2015. The Rust Programming Language. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://www.rust-lang.org
[30] Oracle Corp. 2019. Secure Coding Guidelines for the Java SE, version 4.0. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/
java/seccodeguide-139067.html
[31] Franklin Schrans, Daniel Hails, Alexander Harkness, Sophia Drossopoulou, and Susan Eisenbach. 2019. Flint for Safer Smart Contracts. (2019).
arXiv:1904.06534
[32] Robert C Seacord. 2013. Secure Coding in C and C++. Addison-Wesley.
[33] Ilya Sergey, Vaivaswatha Nagaraj, Jacob Johannsen, Amrit Kumar, Anton Trunov, and Ken Chan Guan Hao. 2019. Safer smart contract programming
with Scilla. In Object-oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and Applications (OOPSLA ’19). https://doi.org/10.1145/3360611
[34] Emin Gün Sirer. 2016. Thoughts on The DAO Hack. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/17/thoughts-on-the-
dao-hack/
[35] Stack Overflow. 2019. Developer Survey Results 2019. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://insights.stackoverflow.com/survey/2019
19
Coblenz et al.
[36] Andreas Stefik and Stefan Hanenberg. 2014. The Programming Language Wars: Questions and Responsibilities for the Programming Language
Community. In Symposium on New Ideas, New Paradigms, and Reflections on Programming and Software (Onward! 2014). 17. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2661136.2661156
[37] Andreas Stefik and Susanna Siebert. 2013. An empirical investigation into programming language syntax. ACM Transactions on Computing Education
(TOCE) 13, 4 (2013), 19.
[38] Robert E. Strom and Shaula Yemini. 1986. Typestate: A programming language concept for enhancing software reliability. IEEE Trans. Software
Engineering SE-12, 1 (1986), 157–171. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSE.1986.6312929
[39] Nick Szabo. 1997. Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks. First Monday 2, 9 (1997). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v2i9.548
[40] The Linux Foundation. 2020. Hyperledger. (2020). https://www.hyperledger.org.
[41] The Linux Foundation. 2020. Hyperledger Fabric. Retrieved February 18, 2020 from https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
[42] Phillip Merlin Uesbeck, Andreas Stefik, Stefan Hanenberg, Jan Pedersen, and Patrick Daleiden. 2016. An Empirical Study on the Impact of
C++ Lambdas and Programmer Experience. In International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 760–771.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2884781.2884849
[43] Philip Wadler. 1990. Linear types can change the world. In Programming concepts and methods, Vol. 2. 347–359.
[44] Serdar Yegulalp. 2018. Rust language is too hard to learn and use, says user survey. https://www.infoworld.com/article/3324488/rust-language-is-
too-hard-to-learn-and-use-says-user-survey.html
20
